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Land use management is relevant to the discussion of environmental policy because 
regulation of land use and growth has been used as an instrument of environmentally 
concerned actors. More generally, growth management policy is best characterized as 
regulatory, because state and local governments use public policy to direct private 
behavior (Feiock, 1994). It is appropriate to note however that, the consequences of 
growth management are inherently distributive. Molotch (1976) depicted a city as an 
aggregate of competing land-based interests. Decisions regarding growth, at the local or 
any other level, are then decisions of who gets what, where, and how (Lasswell, 1936). 
These interests refer not only to competition for economic development but also for 
quality of life under the heading of growth management. 
In this discussion of land use management policy, I proceed in the following manner. 
First, I begin by describing the history and evolution of American land use planning 
activities and policies throughout the XX century. Next, I succinctly describe the land use 
policy tools employed over the years and the context in which they have been used. In the 
core of the paper, I apply a transaction cost theory to explain the relationship between 
states and localities in terms of economic and political transaction costs. I conclude with 
some suggestions regarding hypothesis and future theory testing. 
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Historical Perspective on Land Use Management 
 
The historical roots of American land use planning can be traced back to the early 
twentieth century when planning commissions were created throughout the country, 
zoning began, and the planning profession was established through the American City 
Planning Institute founded in 1917 (Catanese, 1979). Triggered by the Reform 
movement, the professionalization of planners as technicians had a significant impact in 
local government practices, making planning and land use regulation widely accepted 
functions and brought about zoning as a new planning tool (Palen, 1992). 
The first comprehensive zoning ordinance was adopted in 1916 by the city of New 
York, regulating the use of land and the bulk and height of its buildings. The first piece of 
federal legislation was the Standard State Zoning Enabling Act (1922), which allowed 
states to grant zoning powers to cities. In 1926 the constitutionality of zoning was 
debated and upheld in the Euclid v. Ambler Realty case, contributing to make zoning 
practices widespread (Catanese, 1979). The most significant and immediate impact of 
zoning regulations was allowing jurisdictions to plan and adjust new residential 
development to street design and service delivery (Schiffman, 1989).     
For many years zoning was the dominant form of land use control in the United 
States. Local land use regulation originated in the 1920s and 1930s consisted of zoning 
agencies and ordinances but, in many cases, lacked enforcement. This was especially true 
of rural areas, where the traditional American values of individualism and pursuit of 
wealth were still dominant (Popper, 1988) and collided with long-term uses and 
productivity of the land as well as values of equity, ecology, and aesthetics 
(Wandesforde-Smith, 1990). With the adoption of zoning practices, the local market was 
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no longer purely free, but the decisions were still made in a context of a competitive 
market for land use.  
During the 1930s, national planning appears in the context of the New Deal, with the 
National Resources Planning Board as the federal agency in charge of incentivating states 
to create state planning agencies. This top down approach to planning had conditions to 
be successful given the amount of intergovernmental coordination, but failed when the 
state planning agencies were converted into wartime emergency boards focused on the 
conservation of scarce resources (Catanese, 1979). 
In the post-war years the emphasis upon economic development shifted the planning 
initiatives from the national to the states and, especially to the local level. Soon, however, 
the local initiatives became dependent upon the federal government for financial 
assistance, particularly, in urban renewal and housing programs. The National Housing 
Acts of 1949 and 1954 and the Section 701 program are examples of this top-down 
approach to land use management and illustrates a situation where urban planning 
becomes a response to federal incentives instead of a response to local needs (Catanese, 
1979).  
This state of affairs begins to change in the 1960s as a result of the expansion in size 
of new public and private development projects and the creation of the interstate highway 
system. It became apparent that local regulation was insufficient to deal with new 
challenges ensuing from this building frenzy, such as urban sprawl, strip development, 
pollution by industrial facilities, and development of environmentally sensitive lands.  
In a context where the impacts became extra-local, intervention by upper levels of 
government was deemed as necessary and was pushed to the forefront of the agenda by a 
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coalition of environmentalists, city planners, land use lawyers, state and federal officials, 
progressive businesses and developers, and citizen activists (Popper, 1988). This 
movement, known as the “quiet revolution”, took its name from an influential book by 
Bosselman and Callies entitled The Quiet Revolution in Land Use Control (1972). 
 
Patterns of Intergovernmental Relationships 
 
Interestingly, state level regulation and intervention is partly a consequence of local 
level government failures. Local zoning practices are often accused of artificially 
generating higher housing prices. Unable to convince local officials of the relevance of 
their claims, interest groups advocating affordable housing resorted to expand the scope 
of conflict by convincing the governor and the legislature of the state of California of the 
nefarious consequences of the implementation of growth controls (Schattschneider, 1975; 
Schiffman, 1989). This change in policy venue (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993), from the 
local to the state level of government, is triggered by the avoidance on the part of local 
officials of redistributive issues (Peterson, 1981). On the other hand, state actions on 
growth management issues are resisted by local authorities and local interests on the 
grounds that it reduces their autonomy and choice in dealing with growth and forces 
developers to build in certain areas (Schiffman, 1989). 
The failure of local markets to provide efficient growth patterns has three 
components. First, negative externalities affected the quality of life in the community in 
question. Second, the harmful consequences of growth affected neighboring communities 
creating the need for coordination of efforts in order to reduce these spillovers and 
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encourage orderly growth. Third, information asymmetries prevail in local housing and 
homebuilding markets justifying intervention through state regulations. 
In the 1970s the Federal government begins to exert pressure over state governments 
in order to make them enact land use regulations (Chapin and Kaiser, 1985). Several 
pieces of legislation were enacted with clear land use implications. The 1972 Coastal 
Zone Management Act allowed the U.S. Department of Commerce to allocate grants to 
states in the value of $16 million a year to plan and regulate coastal development 
(Popper, 1988). Through the 1970 Clean Air Act, the 1972 Clean Water Act, and the 
1974 Safe Drinking Water Act, the EPA pressured states to adopt controls over the 
intensity of industrial, retail, and recreational developments which have impacts in air 
and water pollution (non point sources) (Chapin and Kaiser, 1985).  
State governments established mandatory review of local government decisions and 
assume powers allowing them to overturn those decisions (Mazmanian and Morell, 
1990). Some states starting with Vermont (1970) and Florida (1972) adopted a series of 
state laws requiring comprehensive local plans, while other states in the northeast, upper 
Midwest, and far west adopted environmentally-oriented state land use laws (Popper, 
1988). 
Bollens (1992) argues that this first pattern of intergovernmental relationships can be 
best described as preemptive and regulatory. Hawai (1961), Vermont (1970) and Florida 
and California (1972) are examples of state programs with direct preemption of local 
authority and/or repeal power over all local decisions with extra-local impacts. At the 
time, state intervention was best characterized as growth restrictive rather than growth 
accommodating. While before the 1970s the locus of growth management was the local 
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government, by the beginning of the decade this policy area was more centralized then 
ever before and after. 
The peak of the “quiet revolution” was reached in 1974 with the National Land Use 
Policy Act, a national extension of the state comprehensive laws already in place and 
applied to all large developments, approved in the Senate by a large majority, but rejected 
by the House of Representatives (Popper, 1988).  
During the 1970s the objectives involved in growth management policies have 
expanded and so have the tools or instruments used to enact these policies. 
Environmental concerns, slow growth in fast growing areas, control of urban sprawl, 
traffic congestion, pollution, increased crime, decrease in quality of life became some of 
the stated or unstated goals of growth management policy. 
Throughout the second half of the 1970s and the 1980s, however, we witnessed a 
decline in the enforcement of centralized land use regulation. Several factors can be 
pointed to this trend such as sluggish economic growth, increased public distrust in 
government triggered by the resurgence of conservatism in the Reagan years, and crisis in 
the public finances. During this period, the same issues regarding implementation that 
previously had affected local regulation also plagued the new centralized regulation, 
namely poor monitoring and enforcement (DeGrove, 1984; Popper, 1988). 
In spite of this resistance to state legislation, planning laws were put forth in some 
states – Florida, California, Oregon, Washington, and North Carolina – with more 
delicate ecosystems, and more prone to natural catastrophes such as earthquakes, 
hurricanes, or flooding. Nevertheless, the difference in approaches is so large that it 
requires a great deal of effort to code these state growth management laws. 
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During the second half of the 1970s, the diversity of intergovernmental strategies 
increased, with a clear emphasis placed upon increasing decentralization. This shift in the 
trend of state-local relationships was characterized by expanded goals in growth 
management. Besides environmental protection, growth management should also address 
economic development, infrastructure, and quality of life goals (Bollens, 1992). This 
author divides the growth plans resulting from this second wave in two groups: conjoint 
planning and cooperative planning. 
Conjoint plans are characterized by top-down implementation, with local 
governments expected to adopt growth management plans consistent with state goals or 
standards. The enforcement of these goals/standards is achieved through penalties and 
mandates such as the withdrawal of state funding and revocation of local discretionary 
powers. The best examples of state-local conjoint planning are Oregon (1973), California 
(1976), Hawaii (1978), Florida (1985), Rhode Island (1988), and Washington (1990).   
Cooperative planning is a form of bottom-up decision-making and implementation. 
Consistency with state goals and standards is stimulated by incentives to local 
governments such as state funding, technical assistance, and the concession of local 
discretionary powers (Bollens, 1992).    
The decision of the states to manage growth was made based on the need to correct 
local market failures such as negative externalities, information asymmetries, and 
collective action problems. In addition, reasons other than efficiency can be added to 
justify growth management including distributional goals and values, such as the 
provision of affordable housing to low-income families. 
 8
The shift in the characteristics of the state-local relationships can be attributed to an 
attempt to minimize transaction costs. First, when full decentralization of decisions and 
implementation made it difficult to address extra-local impacts of growth, state 
intervention became necessary. Second, the form of state and regional intervention is a 
trial-and-error process. States and regions began by adopting preemptive strategies. Soon 
they discover the inadequacy of preemption to deal with problems exclusively local. 
Moreover, preemptive regulation triggers a pattern of adversarial relations between states 
and localities, which leads to less than efficient results in growth management. 
Currently, like many other policy areas, land use management is essentially a state 
and local government affair. State intervention is usually confined to one or more of three 
areas (deHaven Smith, 1984): regulation of particular types of development, regulation of 
particular types of geographical areas, and mandated planning to control local zoning. 
More importantly, states provide the framework to local policy choices. States growth 
management systems influence and require changes to be implemented at the local level. 
These systems help local governments to communicate among each other, reach 
intergovernmental agreements, and share costs of economic development and growth 
(Cogan, 1994).    
The instruments used include regulatory tools such as zoning, transfer of development 
rights, or low density agricultural designations, direct or indirect expenditures by 
government such as land trusts, tax incentives, or tax programs, a wide range of public 
service provision to guide development including urban service boundaries, point-based 
permit systems, population caps, and moratoria on building permits, and expansion of 
local government revenues through impact fees, user fees, and special assessments 
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(Smith, 1993). The following section provides an overview of these policy instruments 
and the context of their adoption. 
 
Land Use Policy Instruments 
 
There are two types of land use policy tools. The first generation of policies includes 
zoning, restrictions on housing supply, and population caps. Zoning was the first land use 
instrument to be put in practice by local governments. The rationale for the use of this 
regulatory tool was the presence of negative externalities resulting from conflicting uses 
of neighboring sites. In particular, zoning was employed to minimize negative 
externalities by assuring that incompatible uses were avoided and overintensive uses of 
one site infringed on the well-being of neighboring sites (Heilbrun, 1987). 
Until the early 1970s, restrictions on building permits issued and imposition of 
growth moratoria were quite frequent. Soon, however, this type of land use controls was 
proved, both theoretically (O’Sullivan, 1996) and empirically (Black and Hoben, 1985; 
Dowall, 1980; 1981; Schwartz, Hansen, and Green, 1981), to have inflationary effects 
driving up the price of new housing. 
The second generation encompasses development impact fees, standardized levels of 
service, and comprehensive planning including residential, commercial, and industrial 
development restrictions (Navarro and Carson, 1991).  
Schiffman (1989) divides this second generation of growth policies in two groups. 
The first one located in the 1950s where open space and agricultural zoning, architectural 
review, floodplain zoning, billboard controls, cluster design, planned unit development, 
and phased growth ordinances are the “new” techniques used to cope with “new” goals 
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such as watershed protection, landmarks designation, historic preservation, open space, 
aesthetics, and timing of development. This group of policies consists in more sensitive 
and flexible tools available to local decision makers and increased their discretion in 
establishing the conditions under which development takes place. 
The second group appearing in the 1970s consists of impact fees, tax-exempt bonds, 
transfer of development rights, linkage policies, and incentive zoning (density bonuses). 
These instruments of land use management appear in a context of refusal by the federal 
and state governments to continue to provide support for growth infrastructure and of 
financial stress among local governments incapable of supplying it. The greatest step to 
the use of growth management tools to finance infrastructure was Golden v. Planning 
Board of Town of Ramapo (1972) through which development was made conditional on 
the developer payment for improvements the city is unable or unwilling to provide 
(Schiffman, 1989). 
Whereas the first generation of policies emphasized growth controls, the second 
highlights growth management. Although one may expect much overlap between the 
individuals and groups supporting both types of policy, it is clear that some major 
differences exist. The large increase in the adoption of land use management tools seems 
to have sparked conflicts not only because the combination of certain tools maybe 
redundant, but also because some instruments may cancel each other out (Smith, 1993). 
The author mentions two situations where the opposition of goals is both visible and 
frequent: the achievement of environmental goals often conflicts with the fiscal needs of 
the community and the requirement of minimum densities contradicts zoning to control 
negative externalities. 
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Despite these problems, the expansion of the land use manager toolbox is helpful 
because it allows the use of instruments tailored to each community’s needs and reduces 
the use of inappropriate or blunt tools in land use as it occurred in the past. 
Finally, the understanding of conflicting goals in land use policy explains the use of 
such diverse set of instruments. Since the individuals and groups involved in this policy 
area have conflicting interests, it is reasonable to expect that state and local officials will 
respond to specific tools to achieve each specific goal. 
The following section addresses the choice of policy instruments using a political 
economy approach. Using transaction cost concepts, I explain why two levels of 
government – state and local – are involved in this policy area. Next I discuss the uses 
and impacts of the diverse land use policy tools from an economic efficiency perspective 
and in an effort to minimize economic transaction costs. Thirdly, I justify the adoption of 
land use policy tools even when it is not economically efficient as an attempt by state and 
local officials to minimize political transaction costs incurred in dealing with 
contradictory goals among their constituencies. 
 
The Political Economy of Land Use Management 
 
The justification for land use management is relevant for the analysis for several 
reasons. First, economic transaction costs – negative externalities and information 
asymmetry – affect the efficient functioning of the land use market. Second, communities 
have different attitudes and preferences regarding growth and, for that reason, will choose 
policies and regulations consistent with those preferences. Third, when a state enacts a 
mandate regarding growth management, the characteristics of the mandate will influence 
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the degree to which each locality complies with the mandate or engages in circumventing 
it.  
The goal of this section is to present the political economy of the policy tools at the 
disposal of state and local officials when adopting and implementing land use 
management policy. Contrary to what occurs with solid waste policy instruments, the 
growth management tools are numerous and difficult categorize. In spite of these 
difficulties, in the next two sections, I attempt to grasp at the economic and political 
implications of land use policy choices without the intention of being exhaustive in my 
discussion..  
 
Land Use Management as a Production Technology Choice 
 
 
Economically, when facing decisions regarding growth, state and local officials 
would choose the alternative or combination of alternatives that maximizes the benefits 
of the median taxpayer at the least cost. The question then becomes what are the benefits 
and costs of growth management. In a perfect market system, decisions made by citizens 
and businesses will result in a Pareto efficient allocation of land uses so that government 
intervention through land use regulation is not necessary since it alters competitive 
market choices.  
In practice, however, the local market for land use rarely works efficiently making it 
necessary for state governments to correct market failures (negative externalities, 
information asymmetries, among others) plaguing local market allocations. 
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State Government Regulation and Allocational Efficiency 
 
Healy and Rosenberg (1979) identified four major reasons that justify state 
intervention: interjurisdictional spillovers, local interests diverging from general public 
interest, problems in geographical areas not subjected to local control, and difficulties 
arising in the implementation of state policies and state investments.  
Interjurisdictional spillovers are generally considered economically sound reasons for 
state level interventions because inefficient allocations result when one locality’s land use 
policy hinders the policy activities of neighboring localities (Healy and Rosenberg, 
1979). It can be argued that, in certain instances, it is possible for localities to reach 
informal agreements in the tradition of the Coase solution to externalities (Coase, 1960). 
However, this solution is only viable in a small numbers and short-term context. As 
transaction costs increase, a hierarchical solution via state regulation may be the 
necessary way to curtail externalities of growth and growth itself as a spillover. 
State regulation is also justified when local interests do not coincide with the interests 
of the median taxpayer. If the total welfare derived by noncitizens from experiencing the 
wildlife in a given locality exceeds the total welfare of the citizens of that community 
derived from its land use policy then state action is acceptable on efficiency grounds1. 
The reason for this being that the increase in land prices that land use controls generates 
captures the true social cost of consumption of the scarce resources (Goldberg and 
Chinloy, 1984). 
In contrast with urban areas, many rural areas lack land use regulation in many cases 
due to the lack of resources and small local government size that renders impossible a 
                                                 
1 Although this situation is not strictly Pareto efficient, it is, at least, a Pareto improvement move. 
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proper analysis of costs and benefits of large scale development projects. This fact 
justifies the intervention of state governments, frequently requiring environmental impact 
assessments or evaluation of developments of regional impact, which can only be made 
by a professional staff with proper means of enforcement (Healy and Rosenberg, 1979). 
Finally, it is crucial to highlight that state government decision-making and 
implementation of policies in areas other than land use management may have indirect 
impacts in this policy area. These policy spillovers can be exemplified by state 
investments in the highway system which alter the value and potential uses of a given 
parcel of land and hence the rate of local growth (Healy and Rosenberg, 1979). 
Ultimately, state land use regulation might be needed to correct inefficiencies generated 
by actions in other policy areas. 
The four reasons discussed here and by Healy and Rosenberg (1979) are justifications 
for state land use regulation and intervention on allocational efficiency grounds. As we 
shall see later, state intervention is often justified on distributional equity grounds 
(Goldberg and Chinloy, 1984; Weimer and Vining, 1999). In the remainder of this 
section, however, I address the economic consequences of the use of land use policy 
instruments.   
 
Economic Impact of Land Use Management Tools 
 
One of the most commonly discussed consequences of land use management is 
precisely its impact on housing prices and economic development. There is large 
consensus among authors that “first generation” growth controls such as zoning practices 
(Navarro and Carson, 1991) raise housing prices by reducing the supply of land or its 
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developmental potential (Dowall, 1981; Schwartz, Hansen, and Green, 1981; Denzau and 
Weingast, 1982; Engle, Navarro, and Carson, 1992).   
Using a comparative quasi-experimental design, Schwartz, Hansen, and Green (1981) 
found housing price increases in Petaluma, California as a result of the city’s 
comprehensive growth management plan imposing controls on the number, location, and 
type of housing units. Landis (1986) argued that restrictions on the supply of developable 
land generate local markets controlled by local homebuilders operating less efficiently 
and capturing monopoly rents. As the author suggests, even the perception that not 
enough parcels of developable land are supplied leads to market speculation and 
significant increases in housing and land prices. 
In a study of 30 metropolitan areas, Black and Hoben (1985) concluded that the 
restrictiveness of growth controls is positively associated with land and housing prices. 
Significantly, policies that direct the amount, type, location, and timing of private 
development are likely to affect directly the supply of developable land and indirectly the 
demand leading to price inflation. 
Pollakowski and Wachter (1990) estimated the direct and spillover effects of zoning 
controls on housing prices concluding that land use regulations raise housing and 
developed land prices within a locality. They modeled interjurisdictional effects and 
found that when zoning restrictiveness increases in adjacent areas, the housing prices in 
the area under analysis also increase due to a spillover demand effect. The exception 
occurs when, due to amenity effects, the adjacent area captures the full demand, leaving 
the prices unchanged in the area under analysis (see also Landis, 1992).   
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A study focusing on local growth controls in seven midsize California cities 
contradicts previous empirical evidence (Landis, 1992). The author presents three 
explanations for these findings. First, it is possible that the growth controls enacted are 
ineffective and, in that case, fail to act as constraints on the supply of land or housing or 
as stimulators of demand. Second, spillover demand can be accommodated in nearby 
communities avoiding price increases in the community under analysis by diminishing 
demand pressures. Finally, the effect of growth controls on land and housing prices may 
be small system wide. In other words, housing prices may be more sensitive to other 
factors affecting the whole region such as interest rates, job growth, and housing supply 
constraints. 
The second generation of growth controls is essentially directed at sustaining the 
quality of life in a community by adding costs to development through impact fees or 
environmental impact statements. Growth is accepted if the new residents pay for the 
public facilities and infrastructure required by the development and if pollution, traffic 
congestion, and school overcrowding levels are kept low (Navarro and Carson, 1991). 
These growth management tools inflate housing prices from the demand side by 
increasing the quality of life in a community and attracting larger demand to the 
jurisdiction where they are enacted. 
As it has been proven empirically, development impact fees also inflate lot and 
housing prices from the supply side (Skaburskis and Qadeer, 1992; Singell and Lillydahl, 
1990). Skaburskis and Qadeer (1992) found that lot prices in three Toronto suburban 
municipalities increased by an amount 20 percent greater than the development impact 
fee imposed. The authors argue that the expectation of increases in the value of impact 
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fees leads to early conversion thereby reducing land and housing prices. This last finding 
points to the effects of increased transaction costs (uncertainty) upon local housing and 
growth markets. More dramatic price effects were found by Singell and Lillydahl (1990) 
in their study of impact fee adoption in Loveland, Colorado. The empirical evidence 
indicates that an increase in impact fees of $1,182 led to an increase in the price of new 
houses of $4,500 immediately after the adoption and, nine months later, to an increase of 
$3,300. More importantly, buyers of new houses rather than developers or landowners, 
support the price increases.    
Empirical evidence also supports the idea that growth management regulation hinders 
economic development. Feiock (1994) found that the implementation of concurrency 
regulations in Florida counties had a significant negative impact on building permits. In 
another study, Denslow, O’ Dell, and Shermyen (1993) found that construction jobs and 
estimated housing starts fell more in counties adopting comprehensive plans earlier than 
others adopting later. In particular, an additional year of comprehensive plan was linked 
with seven percentage points lower employment in construction and about eleven 
percentage points lower estimated housing starts.     
The summary of the economic consequences of land use management tools allows us 
to recognize the implications for the land market involved in their adoption. 
Economically, land use managers would choose the alternative(s) that maximizes the 
benefits of the median taxpayer at the least cost. The discussion of the economic impacts 
of these policy tools indicates possible (re)distributive effects in their adoption and 
implementation and justifies the next step: an analysis of the goals and interests 
underlying each land use policy. For a better understanding, the next section addresses 
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the actors involved in this policy area and their impact in making their preferences 
prevail. 
 
Land Use Management Policy Tools as Consumption Goods 
 
All the land use management tools have an economic side that frames their choice 
and implementation. However, land use policies are not based in economic efficiency 
alone, but are largely influenced by different actors’ preferences at the national, state, and 
local levels. Because land use management serves different goals, it is understandable 
that preferences for their use will vary across different groups, with policy tools 
becoming consumption goods. 
In the enactment of land use management tools, a large number of goals are usually 
mentioned including combat of urban sprawl and loss of farmland, protect the natural and 
visual environment, defense of the interests of existing residents by securing 
homogeneity in the community and steady increase in property values, increase the 
provision of affordable housing, and preserve local fiscal health (Healy and Rosenberg, 
1979; Smith, 1993). Many of these goals are clearly distributive since the benefits tend to 
be concentrated on a small number of local actors, usually homeowners, developers, and 
contractors, among others, at the expense of potential incomers. As we go through several 
growth management tools it is possible to highlight these distributive consequences. 
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Policy and Ideological Preferences 
 
Traditionally, conservatives have been associated with less government regulation 
and have been know for, in many cases, distrusting government intervention altogether. 
Nevertheless, even individuals with strong conservative ideological preferences would 
agree that some kind of legislation is necessary. All else equal, however, they would 
prefer government intervention at the local level, which would be considered less 
intrusive to individual choice. Moreover, they would be more likely to prefer land use 
management instruments that potentially can expand local market choices, such as 
incentive zoning2 and transfer of development rights (Kayden, 1992) to command-and-
control regulation. 
Since the conservatives emphasize local level choice, it is reasonable to expect that 
they would oppose any type of state centralized regulation. An intuitive argument for this 
hypothesis is provided by comparing the map of the electoral college of the 2000 election 
with the map of states with growth management plans. Historically conservative states 
such as the Central Plains, Far West and Southern states do not have state growth 
management plans. Texas growth management plan is the least strict of the country and 
the only exception is, obviously, Florida, a true outlier in this regard. On the contrary, 
more liberal states, such as Pacific Coast and New England states have growth 
management plans. 
In general, liberals are more supportive of environmental concerns, social services, 
and government spending. These three reasons combined allow us to hypothesize that 
more liberal citizens and communities will support land use controls which further these 
                                                 
2 The support of incentive zoning, however, might be dependent upon the services rendered by the 
developer. 
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objectives such as open space zoning, mixed-use development, cluster development, or 
zoning variance allowing higher densities. 
Additionally, liberals prefer comprehensive land use regulation even though 
conservatives are likely to support it if high-powered incentives (reelection) are present. 
However, the perceived benefits from managing land use accruing to a community 
depend on its socioeconomic and professional composition. For this reason, elected 
officials on both sides are expected to incur in ideological costs, especially conservative 
officials in liberal communities and vice-versa. 
Finally, it is worth mentioning that the ideological split argument along the lines of 
market based regulatory approaches supported by conservatives and command-and-
control regulation defended by liberals is not new (Kayden, 1992), but should be the 
object of empirical testing. 
 
Political Benefits 
 
As it occurs in other policy areas, land use management also involves conflicts of 
interests between opposing views and interests. The decisions of state legislators and 
local officials reflect the balance of the conflicting interests within this policy field and, 
in general, will respond to the pressures exerted in the context of decision-making. 
Several examples of land use controls adoption should make this point more clear.  
The oldest and best-known type of land use control – zoning – has been accused, over 
the years, of having highly political and distributive impacts. The manipulation of zoning 
regulations can produce exclusion of low and moderate income in wealthy suburban 
towns. This can be achieved either by zoning a community for single family housing only 
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and/or requiring a large building lot for new houses (Heilbrun, 1987; see also O’Sullivan, 
1996). 
Three main reasons are commonly pointed out to the practice of exclusionary zoning 
(Heilbrun, 1987). First, in-coming citizens are not able to fully pay for the service costs 
they impose on the community and, hence, are considered undesirable from a fiscal point 
of view. Second, families move to suburban areas to avoid the typical problems of the 
city and enjoy suburban amenities. In this line of reasoning, they will oppose any type of 
growth that can threaten their quality of life. Exclusionary zoning along with building and 
population caps is an effective land use controls in accomplishing this goal. Finally, 
zoning can be used to prevent race and socioeconomic class integration under the 
argument that an increase in the number of racial and economic minorities will increase a 
community’s crime and delinquency. These three major reasons allow us to understand 
why local officials may have strong incentives to support or oppose local land use 
controls in general and zoning in particular.  
In addition to these political/distributive issues, zoning variances also contribute to 
this departure from economic efficiency. Zoning variances are changes in the rules of the 
game which create winners and losers that might be different from the ones under the 
previous set of rules. This occurs when developers lobby for and receive from local 
governments a zoning variance that breaks with previously established restrictions. Who 
wins and who loses depends on what were the restrictions in place. Environmental 
interests loose when variances are issued for open space zoning areas. Suburban white 
upper class citizens loose when variances are issued allowing higher densities in areas 
previously subject to fiscal zoning, large lot zoning, or building caps.      
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Another case of land use controls with distributive consequences similar to zoning 
ordinances is impact development fees. Impact fees and system development charges 
have been called regressive due to the fact that the amount charged is fixed, becoming a 
larger burden on those with less ability to pay (Nelson, 1995; Snyder and Stegman, 
1987). However, the criteria in which the impact fee is based can influence the degree of 
regressivity. Empirical work in Palm Beach County, Florida, showed that when the fee is 
established having the type of residency as the basis, it will be highly regressive, but if 
the criteria is residential unit size, then fees become proportional, with the number of 
bedrooms being an intermediate criteria (Nicholas, 1992). 
In a competitive market, the burden of the fee falls on consumers (increase in housing 
prices) and landowners (decrease in land prices) (O’Sullivan, 1996) producing 
distributive consequences by excluding moderate and low-income families from the 
jurisdiction (Nelson, 1995). In municipalities where moderate and low-income families 
prevail, it is less likely to witness the adoption of impact fees. The opposite might occur 
in wealthier communities, where exclusion of these groups might be achieved through the 
implementation of this land use instrument. Either way, the decision regarding land use 
policies rests primarily in the hands of local officials concerned with the maximization of 
their political goals. This fact is particularly real in the case of impact fees, with local 
officials focusing attention upon the preferences of existing residents (voters) and new 
comers having little to say on the adoption of this land use management tool (Beatley, 
1988; Nelson, 1995). 
Different goals and interests are involved in the adoption and implementation of 
density bonuses. This land use tool, also known as incentive zoning, allows private 
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developers to buy certain existing zoning restrictions from the municipality in exchange 
for the provision of social equipment such as affordable housing, day care centers, and 
job training (Kayden, 1992; Rubin, Seneca, and Stotsky, 1990; Schiffman, 1989). Local 
officials are more likely to support the adoption of this land use management tool in more 
diverse, highly dense, and less wealthy communities because the opposition to these 
initiatives is less likely3. 
The examples provided of the political benefits available to government officials in 
exchange for land use controls adoption are not, by any means, unique or representative. 
The discussion was conducted in order to illustrate the political implications of each 
policy instrument choice. Next, I proceed in a similar manner regarding the 
socioeconomic and demographic factors affecting the supply of policy tools. 
 
Socio-economic Factors Affecting Supply 
 
The literature describes growth controls as exclusionary (Navarro and Carson, 1991), 
elitist (Logan, 1976), and status-biased (Bollens, 1990; Donovan and Neiman, 1992). The 
social class hypothesis argues that individuals with higher income and educational 
attainment are more likely to support growth controls. Here, I extend this hypothesis to 
both states and localities by arguing that communities with higher per capita personal 
income and educational attainment levels are more likely to commit to land use control 
policies. Because land use management also focuses on amenity levels and ensuring 
higher quality of life, this hypothesis is valid for both the first and the second generation 
of growth policies. 
                                                 
3 Keep in mind that even ideologically conservative officials are likely to support incentive zoning given 
that it works as a market incentive and not as command-and-control regulation 
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Past state and local growth is among one of the most relevant predictors of the 
adoption of growth controls/growth management policies. Although previous studies of 
the impact of population growth have been concentrated at the city level (Baldassare and 
Protash, 1982; Protash and Baldassare, 1983; Dowall, 1980), anecdotal evidence 
indicates that state population growth also constitutes a pressure for the adoption of 
growth management policies (see the case of Florida). 
Growth, as well as urban complexity in terms of environmental, social, fiscal, and 
economic concerns increases the diversity of tools used. This hypothesis suggests that 
need may be one of the major causes of land use policy tools adoption. Related to this is 
population density. Where high densities are a problem we can expect more diverse land 
use instruments to be adopted. 
Interest group activity is expected to influence significantly the adoption of growth 
controls and growth management policies. The effect of two distinct sets of interest 
groups should be analyzed. The first set includes developers, land speculators, builders, 
and mortgage financiers who generally oppose growth control/management policies. The 
second set involves organized groups committed to the preservation of the environment 
that, therefore, favor land use and growth management (Knaap, 1988).  
Due to the nature of the first generation of growth policies one would expect to find 
race as an important predictor of the adoption of growth controls. Arguments in favor of 
two alternative hypotheses can be stated. On one hand states and localities with larger 
percentage of minorities would adopt less growth controls because these minorities are 
more likely to voice their concerns against exclusion through zoning or population caps. 
In addition, growth controls pose difficulties in terms of affordable housing by artificially 
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imposing constraints on the supply side which are a burden upon minorities more than 
upon whites. The alternative hypothesis states that, precisely because the percentage of 
minorities is larger, there would be more pressure from whites for the adoption of growth 
controls by the state or local community. 
The effect of race on growth management decisions, however, is less obvious. 
Growth management may be exclusionary of new entrants, but this exclusion is not so 
much based upon race as it is upon the ability of these new entrants to pay for the 
development they entail for the state or community. 
Growth control policies adopted until and during the 1970s were largely the result of 
the capacity of local elites to mobilize to stop growth, either through zoning or through 
population and housing caps. For this reason, we should expect that states and localities 
are more likely to adopt growth controls if characterized by a participatory political 
culture and proactive neighborhood associations. 
 
Intergovernmental Factors 
 
The choice of growth management instruments is determined not only by the 
characteristics of local officials as suppliers and local socio-economic forces but also 
constrained by state level rules. An important point to be made is that state laws 
regarding both growth policy and solid waste policy define the powers of local 
governments and affect local development, taxes, services, and exclusion (Burns, 1994). 
In the case of growth management this is particularly relevant because states moved, over 
the years, from a relatively decentralized and self-regulatory set of state land use policies 
during the 1960s toward more regulatory, centralized, and comprehensive set of growth 
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management policies and plans. This hypothesis is presented in the literature (Knaap, 
1988; Navarro and Carson, 1991) but backed up by less than systematic evidence. 
Moreover, state land use regulation displays enough diversity that justifies the 
analysis of local level practices both within a state and between (across) states. The 
question of “what” states regulate was the object of discussion by Healy and Rosenberg 
(1979). The work of these authors identifies five major topics of state regulation: areas of 
critical concern, open or unzoned lands, developments of regional impact, land uses 
affecting public investments, and developments of regional benefit. 
Any empirical study regarding local land use practices cannot ignore these state 
interventions. In the remainder of this section, I propose some tentative hypotheses to 
explain state land use regulation. 
First, the areas of critical concern include, most likely, coastal zones, wilderness and 
forest areas, and wetlands. States with more miles of coastal areas and larger percentage 
of forest land are more likely to be concerned with adopting comprehensive state land use 
statutes so as to preserve these areas. 
Secondly, after controlling for other variables, it is plausible that states with larger 
percentage of urban and developed land are less likely to adopt legislation to manage 
open or unzoned lands. In other words, when the percentage of urbanized and developed 
land is high, local governments are likely to have land use controls already in place 
making state legislation less needed. 
Thirdly, the size and number of developments of regional impact is likely to affect a 
state’s decision to directly regulate land use. The number of large commercial and 
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industrial developments can be seen as an indicator of the developments of regional 
impact variable. 
Fourth, states may also wish to control growth in order to minimize demands or 
protect existing public infrastructures (Healy and Rosenberg, 1979). The rate of growth 
of the state should be a good predictor of the likelihood of state actions regarding land 
use. 
Fifth and lastly, certain capital projects are rejected by local communities as bringing 
unwanted impacts but are necessary from the perspective of the region as a whole. In 
these cases we are likely to see state land use interventions as a way of accommodating 
regional needs. 
Besides these five factors that may trigger state land use regulation, one can expect 
that states will also deal with specific problems requiring contextual approaches. More 
importantly, state land use legislation is likely to constrain or direct local land use 
activities and should be taken into account when analyzing local land use policies.     
 
Implications for Future Research 
 
Given the evolution in the relationship between states and their local governments, it 
is important to examine systematically the determinants of state and local actions. Future 
research cannot ignore the intergovernmental link and should address the supply of land 
use policy tools by state and local level officials by describing their ideological 
preferences regarding growth policy, the political benefits accrued, opportunity costs 
encountered, and socio-economic factors affecting supply. 
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The main obstacle facing this project is the lack of compiled and readily available 
measures of state and local land use controls. As previously mentioned the choice of land 
use management tools can be reduced to two major categories - command-and-control 
regulation and market-based regulatory approaches (Kayden, 1992) – but the difficulty in 
allocating land use controls to each of these categories or place them along a continuum 
still remains. 
At the state level, the best approach might be to identify state regulation addressing 
each of the five major areas mentioned by Healy and Rosenberg (1979) and create an 
index of state land use regulation stringency. At the local level, given the number and 
diversity of land use controls, national and state surveys of local governments should 
concentrate upon the policy tools most frequently adopted.   
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